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Terminating Parental Rights: Mental
Illness Disguised as Permanent Neglect,
In re Hime Y
I.

Introduction

The New York courts, in construing section 384-b of the
New York Social Services Law,' continue to struggle with the
termination of parental rights when the parent suffers from a
mental illness.2 When a mental illness creates a disturbance in
the parent's behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment, the child
may have his physical, mental, or emotional health impaired due
to his parent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care.' To
1. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1981).
2. Id. Section 384-b defines "mental illness" as:
an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a
disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking or judgment to such an extent that if such child were placed in or returned to the custody of the parent, the
child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child as defined in the family
court act.
Id. § 384-b(6)(a).
The Family Court Act defines "neglected child" as:
(f) "Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been imparied or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other
person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree -of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education in
accordance with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education
law, or medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care, though financially able to do
so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by using a drug or drugs; or
by using alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions;
or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court; or
(ii) who has been abandoned by his parents or other person legally responsible for
his care.
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1012(f) (McKinney 1975). See N.Y. Soc. Suv. LAw § 371(4-a)
(McKinney 1976) (substantially the same statutory definition).
3. N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 384-b (6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1012(f) (McKinney 1975); N.Y. Soc. Sznv. LAw § 371(4-a) (McKinney 1976). See
supra note 2.
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terminate parental rights when the parent is mentally ill, the
parent must be shown to be "presently and for the foreseeable
future unable, by reason of [his] mental illness . . . to provide
proper and adequate care for [his] child. . . ." Few psychia-

trists and psychologists will give unequivocal opinions that a
mentally ill parent will remain mentally ill in the near future,
given the complex nature of many mental illnesses and the advancement in their medical treatment.5 Mentally ill parents may
be proven unable currently to provide adequate care for their
child; yet often such parents cannot be proven, as statutorially
required, by clear and convincing evidence, a to be unable to pro-

4. N.Y. Soc. SFmV. LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981). The statute sets forth
the grounds for commitment pursuant to a court order in cases where the parent is mentally ill as follows:
(4) An order committing the guardianship an custody of a child pursuant to this
section shall be granted only upon one or more of the following grounds:
(c) The parent or parents, whose consent to the adoption of the child would otherwise be required in accordance with section eleven of the domestic relations law,
are presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or
mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care for a child who has been
in the care of an authorized agency for the period of one year immediately prior to
the date on which the petition is filed in the court.
Id.
Section 384-b(4)(c) was enacted by the legislature in 1976. 1976 N.Y. LAws 666, § 3.
Its predecessor was section 384-(7)(a), which was enacted in 1973 and amended in 1975.
1973 N.Y. LAws 863, § 2, as amended by 1975 N.Y. LAWS 706, § 1. In commenting on
section 384(7)(a) the Temporary State Commission on Child Welfare said:
it serves a salutory purpose in freeing children for adoption where they formerly
would have remained in foster care throughout their minority because their mentally ill parents could not have been deemed to have abandoned them due to their
mental condition. The Commission also observes that the abandonment ground
for involuntary termination of parental rights continues to be troublesome. The
courts in applying the statute have refused to make a finding of abandonment
where the parents maintain even a very tenuous contact with their children
through infrequent post cards, birthday greetings or other insubstantial gestures.
THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD WELFARE, reprintedin THE CHILDREN OF THE STATE 144 (1975) (hereinafter cited as CHILDREN OF THR
STATE I].
This note only applies to termination of parental rights on the ground of mental
illness. For a discussion of mental retardation and termination of parental rights see
Note, The Constitutionality of New York's ParentalTermination Statute as Applied to
the Mentally Retarded Parent: Equal Protection and Due Process Objections, 46 ALs.
L. REv. 271 (1981).
5. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
6. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(3)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
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vide such care "for the foreseeable future."'7
Such parents, after In re Hime Y., 8 may have their parental
rights terminated because of "permanent neglect." In In re
Hime Y., the court of appeals construed10 section 384-b of the
Social Services Law, which defines permanent neglect as the failure of a parent for a period of more than one year to "maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so,"" and found that mental ill-

ness will not be an excuse for planning if the parent can be
found physically and financially able to plan.18 By reading the
words "physically and financially able" to plan literally, the
court refused to include any element of mental capacity in the
7. Id. § 384-b(4)(c). See supra note 4.
8. 52 N.Y.2d 242, 418 N.E.2d 1305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 286, remanded,81 A.D.2d 313, 440
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 54 N.Y.2d 282, 429 N.E.2d 792, 445 N.Y.S.2d
114 (1981).
9. N.Y. Soc. Saav. LAw § 384-b(4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981). One of the grounds
for obtaining a court order committing the guardianship and custody of a child is that
"[the child is a permanently neglected child." Id. Section 384-b(7)(a) defines a "permanently neglected child" as:
a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian
has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such child came
into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly
to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically
and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the event that the parent defaults
after due notice of a proceeding to determine such neglect, such physical and
financial ability of such parent may be presumed by the court.
Id. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 611 (McKinney 1975) (substantially same statutory
definition).
The "plan for the future" must provide adequate care and a stable home, and be
realistic and feasible. N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 384-b(7)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981). Infrequent contacts will not, by themselves, preclude a finding of permanent neglect. Id. §
384-b(7)(b).
The permanent neglect provision was added in 1959, joining abandonment as
grounds for terminating parental rights in New York. 1959 N.Y. LAws 450, § 2. The
original statute required the parent to "maintain contact with and plan for the future of
the child." Id. (emphasis added). In 1973, the legislature changed the test, requiring the
parent to "maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child." 1973 N.Y. LAws
870, § 1 (emphasis added). See infra note 50 for the statutory definition of a "plan for
the future of the child."
10. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d 242, 251, 418 N.E.2d 1305, 1308-09, 437 N.Y.S.2d 286,
289-90 (1981).
11. N.Y. Soc. SuRv. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra note 9.
12. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 251, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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ability to plan for a child's future. 8 Thus, a parent may have his
parental rights terminated due to the failure to plan for his
child's future because of mental illness during the past year or
more, even though the court might not be able to find sufficient
proof of continuing mental illness in the near future to terminate his parental rights based on mental illness alone.
Part I of this note presents background information regarding termination of parental rights. Part II discusses the decisions
in In re Hime Y, and Part III analyzes their impact. In evaluating the court of appeals reasoning, this note concludes that the
use of the permanent neglect provision instead of the mental illness provision circumvents the application of the statute as envisioned by the legislature. The court, by reading the permanent
neglect statute literally, reaches a result where planning is reduced to a physical act with no element of mental capacity contained in it.
II. Background
The right of a natural parent to the care and custody of his
child has been long recognized as a liberty interest protected by
the United States Constitution.1 4 The Supreme Court has
stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where Justice McReynolds,
writing for the majority, deemed liberty under the fourteenth amendment to include the
right to "marry, establish a home and bring up children .... and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." Id. at 399.
The Supreme Court has found that the protection of the institution of the family to
have underpinnings in many areas of the Constitution. The Court once stated:
[t]he Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 393 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious . . . property rights,"
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) .... The integrity of the family unit
has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405- U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See generally Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1156, 1161-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."1 The institution of the family is regarded as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
and commands high constitutional protection.1 6
Despite the parent's strong interest in raising his child, the
state has an interest in protecting that child when it is shown
that the parent cannot or will not provide adequate care and
custody for the child.1 7 The state may act to protect a child
whose parent grossly fails to provide for the child's physical or
emotional needs.1 8 The state, however, may not rupture the family relationship absent a finding of parental unfitness. 1 ' In New
15. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citation omitted).
16. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(footnote omitted). The Court once referred to the right of parents to raise their children
as "basic in the structure of our society." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968).
17. The state's power in protecting children subjected to inadequate care stems
from two sources, the police power and the parens patriae power. The state, under its
police power, may act to protect the general welfare of its citizens and shield them from
harm. See Muggler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664-67 (1887). Under the parens patriae
power a state may act to promote the welfare of its citizens, such as infants, who lack the
capacity to adequately protect their own best interests. See Mormon Church v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890). See generally Developments, supra note 14, at 11981248 (discussing state interests in the family and limitations on the power of the state).
The doctrine of parens patriae is based in equity, where the court acts to protect
the child as a "wise, affectionate and careful parent" would. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y.
429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) (quoting Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B.
232, 241 (C.A.)).
The New York Court of Appeals has realized the primacy of the family relationship,
stating: "[t]he filial bond is one of the strongest, yet most delicate, and most inviolable of
all relationships, and in dealing with it we must realize that a child is not a mere creature of the State for distribution by it." Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 392, 380
N.E.2d 266, 271, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1978) (citation omitted). For a general discussion of New York statutes which govern adoption, voluntary foster care, and neglect proceedings, see Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of Natural Parents in Child
Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446 (1976).
18. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1031 (McKinney 1975).
19. See, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER),
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated:
[I]f a state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on "the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
Id. (citation omitted) (cited as controlling, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
(unanimous court)).
The "best interests" of the child is a concept which uses many factors in the parent-
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York, parental unfitness has been defined by the legislature to
be conduct such as abandonment of the child, 0 mental illness of
the parent,21 permanent neglect of the child," or physical abuse
of the child by the parent.'3s
child relationship such as the parent's moral fitness, financial means and mental capacity; the duration and continuity of the relationship and its emotional ties; the child's age,
wishes and health. See generally Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,73 YALE L.J. 151, 153 (1963) (many factors of the
vague "best interests" test examined). The "best interests" test is embodied in statutes,
see, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(1)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1981) (it is desirable
that the child remain with his natural parents unless his best interests would be endangered), and case law, see, e.g., Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401
N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977) ("the paramount concern in all custody matters [is] the best
interest[s] of the child.").
A sequence of hearings is imposed by statute when parental rights are sought to be
terminated on the ground of permanent neglect. N.Y. F.m. CT. ACT §§ 622-625 (McKinney 1975). Initially, there must be a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the child
has been permanently neglected. Id. § 622. After the fact-finding hearing is completed, a
dispositional hearing is held to determine whether the best interests of the child require
termination of parental rights. Id. § 625.
In New York, courts may not examine the "best interests" of the child until statutory unfitness has been proven. The court of appeals has stated: "the department has
repeatedly failed,. . . to prove the mother guilty of statutory abandonment or permanent neglect or to show that she is unfit. Absent such a finding the courts may not permanently sever all ties." In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 381, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1320,
418 N.Y.S.2d 339, 343 (1979) (citation omitted).
Prior to In re Sanjivini K., the court of appeals permitted termination of parental
rights on a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543,
356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976). If the child was separated from his natural
parents for an extended period of time and the child formed an attachment to his custodian, the court could examine the child's best interests in determining who would get
custody absent any finding of fault, abandonment, neglect or unfitness of the natural
parent. See id. Accord People ex rel. Gallinger v. Gallinger, 55 A.D.2d 1036, 391
N.Y.S.2d 248 (4th Dep't 1977) (meme.) (child lived with grandparents for over three
years; held, extraordinary circumstances and the best interests of the child mandated
termination of the natural parent's rights).
After frequent terminations on the doctrine of extraordinary circumstances, the
court of appeals restricted its use, requiring a finding of statutory abandonment, neglect
or unfitness. In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339
(1979). The court distinguished Bennett v. Jeffreys, deeming it to have involved informal
placement of a child and the resulting analysis proceeded from common law, not statutory grounds. Id. at 382, 391 N.E.2d at 1320, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 343-44. For a discussion of
the Bennett v. Jeffreys "extraordinary circumstances" test, see Note, The Fundamental
Right to Family Integrity and its Role in New York Foster Care Adjudication, 44
BRoor.LYN L. REV. 63, 94-96 (1977).
20. N.Y. Soc. Simv. LAW § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
21. Id. § 384-b(4)(c). See supra note 4.
22. Id. § 384-b(4)(d). See supra note 9.
23. Id. § 384-b(4)(e).
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A child, dependent upon his parent for his physical and
emotional needs during his infancy and developmental years,
4
has a need to have a strong and stable family relationship.2
When the parent is unable to provide for the child's needs, other
arrangements for the child's care and custody must be found to
protect the child from harm. Foster care2 5 is preferred over institutional placement because its family setting provides both for a
child's physical needs and leads to healthy emotional development. 2 When the prospect for recovery of the unfit parent is
bleak, the child should be able to remain with the foster parents
permanently to not disrupt the growing developmental relationship that it has provided.'7
New York has a well defined statutory scheme intended to:
Provide procedures not only assuring that the rights of the natural parent are protected, but also, where positive nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best interests, needs, and rights of the child by terminating parental rights
and freeing the child for adoption.20
24. J. GOLDSTmN, A. FREuD & A. SoLNrr, BEYoND TE BSr INTRESSm o THE CHILD
13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYoND Tm BUST Irmuws]. See N.Y. Soc. Sagv. LAw §
384-b(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1981) (legislature finds that it is desirable for children
to grow up with a normal family life in a permanent home and such circumstances offer
the best opportunity for children to develop and thrive).
25. Foster care, as used in this note, means the arrangement where a child is placed
with foster parents. A foster parent is one who, although not legally related to the child
nor decreed a parent in formal adoption proceedings, assumes the role of the parent. See
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 371(19) (McKinney 1976). See generally S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS
FAn. 90-106 (1971) (outlining the common-law background and present status of foster
care).
26. Cf. S. KATZ, supra note 25, at 91. (foster care as an alternative to institutional
care provides the child with the advantages of a family setting). The foster parent status
may be elevated to that of a "psychological parent," a term promulgated by the authors
in BEYOND THE BEST INTERSTs, supra note 24. The "psychological parent" is defined as:
one who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs. The psychological
parent may be biological ....
adoptive, foster, or common-law . . . parent, or
any other person. There is no presumption in favor of any of these after the initial
assignment at birth ....
Id. at 98.
27. For a discussion of the effects of uprooting a child at critical developmental
stages, see BEYOND THE BEST INTERsTs, supra note 24, at 31-52.
28. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981). Many children remain in foster care for extended periods of time since parents sometimes fail to recover
from their problems. Section 384-b(1)(b) provides:
many children who have been placed in foster care experience unnecessarily pro-
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Termination of parental rights may be accomplished by a
voluntary surrender of the child by the natural parent"9 or by a
court order.8 0 The first step in involuntary termination proceedings is to have the guardianship and custody of the child committed to an authorized agency8 1 or to foster parents.8 2 An authorized agency or the foster parents may petition the family
court to obtain guardianship and custody of the child when the
parent is allegedly unfit. 8 The court may only commit the
tracted stays in such care without being adopted or returned to their parents or
other custodians. Such unnecessary stays may deprive these children of positive,
nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development
into responsible, productive citizens. The legislature finds that provision of a
timely procedure for the termination, in appropriate cases, of the rights of the
natural parents could reduce such unnecessary stays.

Id.
As a child advances in age, the possibilities of adoption decrease. Through an early
adoption, a young child may avoid the damaging effects of having a family relationship
that is beyond repair, and may better adapt to a new home. The older child, however,
may develop ties with the natural parents regardless of the status of the parental relationship or the parents' condition. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring
the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 623, 688-700 (1976).
29. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981).
30. Id. § 384-b. This note focuses only on involuntary terminations of parental
rights.
31. An "authorized agency" means any agency, association, corporation, institution,
society or other organization which is incorporated or organized under the laws of New
York State, which either by corporate power or by law is empowered to care for, to
"place out" or to "board out" children. Any court or public welfare official of New York
is authorized by law to place out or to board out children. The Department of Social
Services supervises such agencies and all acts in relation to the welfare of children pursuant to the Social Services Law. See N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 371(10) (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1981).
To "place out" means "to arrange for the free care of a child in a family other than
that of the child's parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt or
legal guardian, for the purpose of adoption or for the purpose of providing care." Id. §
371(12). To "board out" means "to arrange for the care of a child in a family, other than
that of the child's parent, step-parent, or legal guardian, to whom payment is made or
agreed to be made for care and maintenence." Id. § 371(14).
32. In New York, the legislature has defined "foster parent" as "any person with
whom a child, in the care, custody or guardianship of an authorized agency, is placed for
temporary or long-term care .
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 371(19) (McKinney 1976).
See supra note 25.
33. The authorized agency must petition the family court to review the foster care
status of the child who has remained in foster care for a continuous period of eighteen
months. The foster parents may petition the family court for review if the child has
resided in their home for a continuous period of eighteen months. N.Y. Soc. SEzv. LAw §
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guardianship and custody of a child in accordance with the statutory grounds set forth by the legislature.'
A.

Termination by Mental Illness

A mentally ill parent will have his parental rights terminated upon a showing, by clear and convincing evidence," that
he is currently and for the near future unable, by reason of a
mental illness, to provide adequate care for his child who has
been in foster care for over one year.8 Such parent's mental illness is to be proven by the testimony of a court-appointed physician and certified psychiatrist or psychologist,' 7 and by other
competent, material, and relevant evidence submitted by the
parent and the agency.88 The legal sufficiency of the proof will
not be determined until the judge has taken the testimony of
the court-appointed physician and psychiatrist or psychologist.8 '
If the parent is found to be mentally ill and unable to care for
392(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981). A proceeding to terminate parental rights under section
384-b is originated by the serving of such petition on the child's natural parents and
other persons as the judge or surrogate may, in his discretion, prescribe. Id. § 384-b(3).
34. Id. § 384-b(4). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. See also supra
note 19 (terminations of parental rights must have standards providing constitutional
protection of the parent's rights).
35. N.Y. Soc. Snav. LAW § 384-b(3)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
36. Id. § 384-b(4)(c). See supra note 4.
37. Id. § 384-b(6)(e). Such appointments are done pursuant to N.Y. JuD. Law § 35
(McKinney Supp. 1981). N.Y. Soc. Sziv. LAW § 384-b(6)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
The parent may not prevent termination of parental rights by refusing to submit to the
examination by the court-appointed experts. The statute states:
[i]f the parent refuses to submit to such court-ordered examination, or if the parent renders himself unavailable therefor whether before or after the initiation of a
proceeding under this section, by departing from the state or by concealing himself therein, the appointed physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, upon the basis
of other available information, including, but not limited to, agency, hospital or
clinic records, may testify without in examination of such parent, provided that
such other information affords a reasonable basis for his opinion.
Id.
There is no privilege between physician and patient; psychologist or psychiatrist and
client; or social worker and client, to exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible. Id. § 384-b(3)(h). There is no privilege against self-incrimination in submitting to a
psychiatric examination when actions are brought to terminate parental rights. See, e.g.,
In re Sloan, 84 Misc.2d 306, 310, 375 N.Y.S.2d 528, 532 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1975)
(court balances the parent's privilege against the best interests of the child).
38. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(6)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
39. Id. § 384-b(6)(c).
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his child, 0 the judge is not required to hold a dispositional hearing to examine the best interests of the child.'"
The New York courts have consistently upheld section 384b(4)(c), with its various requirements, to adequately protect the
parent's constitutional right to raise a family.'4 The requirement
of clear and convincing evidence of a mental illness affecting the
parent's ability to care for the child gives assurance that the parental rights will not be terminated unless unfitness is sufficiently substantiated." Parental rights are not to be terminated
based soley on the parent's status as being mentally ill; some
nexus between the parent's mental illness and his inability to
care for his child must be shown." Since the statute requires

40. A finding that the parent is mentally ill and unable to care for his child does not
constitute an adjudication of the legal status of the parent. Id. § 384-b(6)(d). See supra
note 2 for the statutory definition of "mental illness."
41. See, e.g., In re Daniel A.D., 106 Misc.2d 370, 371, 431 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1980). Contra In re Gross, 102 Misc.2d 1073, 1081, 425 N.Y.S.2d 220,
224-25 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (not requiring a dispositional hearing when mental
illness is alleged violates equal protection and due process when such a dispositional
hearing is required for termination on the ground of permanent neglect). Many judges do
grant dispositional hearings to examine the best interests of the child even though they
are not required by law to do so. See, e.g., In re Daniel A.D., 106 Misc.2d 370, 371, 431
N.Y.S.2d 936, 938 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). See supra note 19 for a discussion of the
"best interests" of the child.
42. See, e.g., In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1981).
There the court upheld the mental illness provision against due process, vagueness and
equal protection claims, stating that while "sufficiently elastic to protect parental rights,
[the statute] is not so indefinite as to deprive parents of fair notice of the behavior effected." Id. at 237, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 225. See Note, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes Terminating Parental Rights, 1980 DuKE L. J. 336.
In New York, the statutory provision for terminating parental rights based on the
parent's mental illness has existed since 1973 in basically the same form. See supra note
4. Courts have looked to the legislature's reenactment of the provision in 1976 as evidence of its acceptance and its constitutionality. See, e.g., In re Ursula P., 108 Misc.2d
181, 437 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 1981).
43. In re the N. Children, 107 Misc.2d 763, 768, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1022 (Faro. Ct.
Kings County 1981); see also In re Marilyn H., 106 Misc.2d 972, 978, 436 N.Y.S.2d 814,
818 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (a parent's constitutional right "appears" to require
the protection of a higher standard of proof in such a proceeding than that in the ordinary civil case).
44. The statute, in defining mental illness, requires that the parent's mental illness
create a danger that the child will be permanently neglected. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384b(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra note 2. But cf In re Millar, 35 N.Y.2d 767,
320 N.E.2d 865, 362 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1974) (mem.) (the court of appeals affirmed the termination order due to the staleness of the case; the court would have preferred more
evidence of the nexus between the mother's mental illness and her inability to care for
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expert testimony of the parent's mental illness, courts have pro-

vided an expert to the parent who is unable to afford one to
rebut the agency's evidence. "5 Additionally, since the statutory
test requires proof of the parent's mental illness in the near fu-

ture, courts have taken judicial notice of the advancement in
e
medical treatment for controlling mental illness.'
B.

Termination by Permanent Neglect
A parent may have his parental rights terminated if it can

be proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, 7 that he has
"permanently neglected" his child."8 A child is permanently neglected when he has been in foster care' 9 for over one year and
the parent has failed to "maintain contact with or plan for the
future of the child, although physically and financially able to do
so. '' 50 During the period the child is in foster care, the agency
her child).
One appellate division court deemed the statute to be constitutional because it addresses conduct rather than status. In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 237, 443 N.Y.S.2d
214, 226 (1st Dep't 1981). As one Massachusetts court stated, "loss of a child may be as
onerous a penalty as the deprivation of the parents' freedom." In re the Custody of a
Minor, 377 Mass. 876, 884, 389 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1979). If, as the Massachusetts court has
stated, termination of parental rights is on the same level as criminal incarceration, a
penalty imposed because of a person's status as being mentally ill would be unconstitutional. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (dictum). The Court stated
that to make the status of being mentally ill a criminal offense would violate the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. Id.
45. In re Roth, 97 Misc.2d 834, 412 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 1979).
The expert may be used in rebut the agency's expert testimony or to question the capability of expert examinations in general. Id. at 835-36, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 568-69.
46. See, e.g., In re the N. Children, 107 Misc.2d 763, 766, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 102021 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 1981).
47. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b(3)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See infra note 55.
48. Id. § 384-b(4)(d). See supra note 9.
49. See supra notes 25-27, 33.
50. N.Y. Soc. Simv. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra note 9.
The phrase "to plan for the future of the child" means:
to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and
parental care for the child within a period of time which is reasonable under the
financial circumstances available to the parent. The plan must be realistic and
feasible, and good faith effort shall not, of itself, be determinative. In determining
whether a parent has planned for the future of the child, the court may consider
the failure of the parent to utilize medical, psychiatric, psychological or other social and rehabilitative services and material resources made available to such
parent.
Id. § 384-b(7)(c).

11

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:125

must use "diligent efforts" to encourage and strengthen the relationship between parent and child when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child.51 A parent who
suffers from alcoholism or drug abuse will be excused from
maintaining contact with or planning for the future of the child
only when such parent is actually hospitalized, institutionalized,
or incarcerated for such sickness. 5 ' Once a fact-finding hearing
on the parent's permanent neglect is completed, a dispositional
hearing to determine the best interests of the child is required
before termination can be ordered.53
The permanent neglect provision has been upheld as constitutional in providing adequate protection to the parent's constitutional right to raise a family." The requirement of proof of
permanent neglect by a fair preponderance of the evidence, however, has recently come under attack as a violation of due process of such rights.'5 Some courts, in recognizing the fundamen51. Id. § 384-b(7)(a). See supra note 9. "Diligent efforts" means:
reasonable attempts by an authorized agency to assist, develop and encourage a
meaningful relationship between the parent and child, including but not limited
to:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parents in developing a plan for appropriate services to the child and his family;
(2) making suitable arrangements for the parents to visit the child;
(3) provision of services and other assistance to the parents so that problems
preventing the discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated;
and
(4) informing the parents at appropriate intervals of the child's progress, development and health.
Id. § 384-b(7)(f).
52. Id. § 384-b(7)(d).
53. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. §§ 622-25 (McKinney 1975). A "dispositional hearing" is
defined as a "hearing to determine whether the interests of the child require that the
parent's custody . . . be terminated permanently and, if so, what order of disposition
should be made." Id. § 623. See supra note 19.
54. See, e.g., In re Anthony L. C.C., 48 A.D.2d 415, 419, 370 N.Y.S.2d 219, 222 (3d
Dep't), appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d 708 (1975). See infra note 55.
55. In re John A.A., 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (3d Dep't 1980) (mem.), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 768 (1981), rev'd sub. nom. Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W.
4333 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1982) (No. 80-5889) (5-4 decision). The Supreme Court held that to
sever the parents' ties to their children, the state must prove permanent neglect by the
stricter standard of "clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 4339. The ruling left the state
free to attempt to terminate the parents' rights by meeting the higher standard. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, said he meant to "express no view on the merits" of
the case. Id.
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tal interest involved, 51 have applied a higher standard of
proof-clear and convincing evidence--to safeguard against the
wrongful dissolution of a family relationship that might be able
to be rehabilitated, given proper guidance and assistance. 6
When a parent is mentally ill, an agency petitioning the
court to terminate his parental rights often alleges the grounds
of mental illness and, alternatively, permanent neglect." It is argued that the mentally ill parent is not physically disabled; thus
such parent must plan for his child's future when he is shown to
be physically and financially able to do so.59
III. In re Hime Y.
A.

The Facts and the Lower Courts' Decisions

Hime Y., removed from her mother's custody by an emergency court order when she was three days old, has never lived
with her natural mother, Elaine S. Y.60 Hime was placed in a
56. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
57. E.g., In re Marilyn H., 106 Misc.2d 972, 979-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d 814, 818-19 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1981). But cf. NATIONAL CoUrcn. oF JUVENIL CoURnT JUDGES, MODEL
STATUTE FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS § 8(1) [Reference File] FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 201:0070 (1977) (fair preponderance of the evidence is the level of proof for the
Act for terminations on the grounds of mental illness and permanent neglect).
58. See, e.g., In re Y'Anique Neal, 75 A.D.2d 741, 427 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1980)
(mem.).
59. In re Stephen B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 666-67, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438, 443 (Fam.Ct. N.Y.
County 1969) (physically able to plan interpreted literally to apply to powers of locomotion only). Contra In re James S., 98 Misc.2d 650, 414 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Fam. Ct. Monroe
County 1979) (physically able to plan interpreted to include mental capacity).
60. In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc.2d 652, 653, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Fam.Ct. N.Y.
County 1977). Hime Y. is the second daughter born to Elaine. Id. Suzanne, Elaine's first
child, was born on April 15, 1972. In re Suzanne N. Yem, 54 A.D.2d 673, 674, 388
N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (1st Dep't 1976) (Kupferman, J.P., dissenting in part) (mem.). Elaine was
found "go-go dancing" after midnight with Suzanne, then three weeks old, wrapped in a
feces-soiled afghan. In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc.2d 652, 653, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1977). In response to this incident, neglect proceedings were commenced based on Elaine's failure to plan for Suzanne. Suzanne was placed with foster
parents once the petition was granted. Id.
Hime, born March 10, 1975, was immediately removed from Elaine in the hospital
by the agency on the ground of Elaine's derivative neglect of Hime. Id. at 653-54, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 384. The agency acted pursuant to title ten of the New York Family Court
Act; the relevant sections read as follows:
Section 1046. Evidence
(a) In any hearing under this article (i) proof of the abuse or neglect of one child
shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other child
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foster home by the Jewish Child Care Association, the agency
which moved for the emergency court order to protect Hime. e
When Hime was sixteen months old the agency petitioned the
family court seeking to terminate Elaine's parental rights on the
grounds of Elaine's mental illness and permanent neglect.'
The family court found that although Elaine was currently

mentally ill, the testimony of Dr. Kessel, the court-appointed
pyschiatrist, failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that in the near future Elaine would be unable to care for
Hime.63 In denying the petition to terminate Elaine's parental
rights, the court stated that "there may yet be room to salvage"

the parent-child relationship." The court ordered that Elaine
was to have Hime for one full day every week, under the supervision of a social worker, for a period of three months, to attempt to rebuild the parent-child relationship.6 5 Upon completion of the three month period, despite Elaine's failure to care

for and build a relationship with Hime, the court found no auof, or the legal responsibility of, the respondent ....
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney 1975).
Section 1024. Emergency removal without court order (a) ... a duly incorporated
society for the prevention of cruelty to children.. . may take a child into protective custody. . . without [a court] order under section one thousand twenty-two
and without the consent of the parent ..

.

. regardless of whether the parent

... ,is absent, if (i) the child is in such circumstance or condition that his continuing in said place of residence or in the care and custody of the parent ...
presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health; and
(ii) there is not enough time to apply for an order under section one thousand
twenty-two.
Id. § 1024(a).
This Note focuses on the proceedings as to Hime only.
61. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 245, 418 N.E.2d at 1306, 437 N.Y.S2d at 287 (1981).
62. In re Suzanne Y., 92 Misc.2d 652, 654, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Fam. Ct. N.Y.
County 1977).
63. Dr. Kessel testified that Elaine was incapable of caring for Hime at present, but
he noted that Elaine had made tremendous improvement and predicted that, although
he could not specify a date, at some time in the future she might be able to care for
Hime. He pointed to her willingness towards therapy and her proper use of prescribed
medication as encouraging signs. He further explained that Elaine's mental illness was
related to childbirth, which, in view of her age, had no chance of recurrence. Id. at 656,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
64. Id. at 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
65. Id. at 661-62, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 389. The court, recognizing that the agency
caseworker had been protective of Hime and hostile towards Elaine, ordered that these
visits be supervised by an impartial social worker from the Legal Aid Society. Id.
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thority to order termination of Elaine's parental rights." To

protect both Elaine's and Hime's interests, the court granted
long-term custody of Hime to the foster parents with liberal visitation privileges to Elaine. 7
The appellate division,6" upon reexamination of the evi-

dence, found that Elaine was shown to be mentally ill for seven
years prior to the termination proceeding, and only one expert
suggested that she might recover "at some unknown future

date."' The court found Elaine to be "minimally functional"
despite medical treatment, and not to "be trusted, either now or
in for foreseeable future, to supply the child with necessaries. ' 70
Modifying the family court's decision, the appellate division

granted the petition to terminate Elaine's parental rights on the
ground of her mental illness.7 1 The appellate division dismissed
the ground of termination of Elaine's parental rights based on
permanent neglect as "academic," concluding that her mental

illness necessarily precluded her from being physically able to
66. In re Suzanne Y., 95 Misc.2d 733, 734, 411 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (Farn. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978). The court was unable to find sufficient proof of any ground of parental
unfitness as set forth in section 384-b, but the court viewed the poosaibility of the return
of Hime to Elaine as "disastrous." Id. at 735, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 133. The court refused to
terminate Elaine's parental rights despite the finding of "extraordinary circumstances"
as established in Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821
(1976). In re Suzanne Y., 95 Misc.2d 733, 735-36, 411 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133-34 (Fain. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978). See supra note 19.
67. In re Suzanne Y., 95 Misc.2d 733, 736, 411 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978).
68. Both Elaine and the agency appealed the family court decision. In re Hime Y.,
73 A.D.2d 154, 154, 425 N.Y.S.2d 336, 336 (1st Dep't 1980).
69. Id. at 160, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The court, examining various psychiatrists' and
psychologists' testimony of their prior examinations of Elaine, found that she "hear[d]
voices," had a "lifelong history of marginal adjustment," had "schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated type, in partial remission or control," and was "grossly psychotic." Id. at
157-58, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
The court found that the medical evidence established that between 1971 and 1978
there had been no measurable change in Elaine's mental condition. Every psychiatrist,
including Dr. Kessel, concluded that Elaine could not care for her children. Dr. Kessel's
prediction as to Elaine's possible future recovery was the sole deviation from the findings
of her unfitness. Id. at 160, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The court viewed Elaine's failure to call
a psychiatrist in her behalf as "an unfavorable inference with regard to the evidence thus
withheld." Id. at 156, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 160, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
71. Id. at 160-61, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41. The court justified its decision to terminate Elaine's parental rights stating that they had to act now "to protect the children."
Id. at 160, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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plan for Hime's future."'
B.

The Court of Appeals Decision
1.

The Majority Opinion

The majority," reviewing the appellate division's decision
terminating Elaine's parental rights, agreed that there was no
doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the
agency and the expert witnesses that Elaine "had been and at
the present time was unable, by reason of a mental illness, to
provide proper care for Hime. ' 7 4 The evidence as to Elaine's
possible future condition and ability to care, however, was less
persuasive. Of all the experts who had examined Elaine, only
one addressed her future condition, and in light of ongoing
treatment that expert foresaw "a good possibility [that] she
could care for the child" at some future date." Since no expert
testimony was offered to refute the possibility of Elaine's future
recovery, the majority reasoned that termination of Elaine's parental rights due to her mental illness and inability to care for
Hime would have to necessarily rest upon inferences drawn from
her past and present inability." The majority stated that such
inferences alone could not serve as the clear and convincing
proof required for termination of parental rights in cases where
expert testimony as to the parent's recovery in the future was
favorable.78 Accordingly, the majority vacated the appellate divi72. Id. at 160, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
73. Judge Jones delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Judge Cooke and
Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, and Meyer. Judge Wachtler delivered the dissenting opinion,
joined by Judge Fuchsberg. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d 242, 418 N.E.2d 1305, 437
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1981).
74. Id. at 248, 418 N.E.2d at 1307, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The majority examined the
scope of the expert testimony required in cases alleging mental illness as a ground for
termination of parental rights. The majority questioned whether the testimony must
consider the consequences of the condition rather than only the existence of a condition,
and further, whether the issue of care, both currently and in the near future, was a
proper subject for expert testimony; but the majority offered no opinion on either point.

Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.
ion was
ence of

Id.
Id. at 248-49, 418 N.E.2d at 1307, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89. See supra note 63.
Id. at 249, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
Id. The majority suggested, however, that in a case where no professional opingiven as to future incapacity, past and present condition might warrant an inferfuture incapacity which would be sufficient to terminate parental rights. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/6

16

1982]

IN RE HIME Y.

sion's termination of Elaine's parental rights based on her
mental illness and inability to care for Hime. g
Considering whether the appellate division was correct in
dismissing the ground of Elaine's permanent neglect as "academic," the majority examined whether a parent's mental illness
would preclude a finding of that parent's permanent neglect.80
Finding no express reference to mental illness in the definition
of permanent neglect,81 the majority reasoned that a mentally ill
parent need only be shown to fail to plan for his child's future,
although physically and financially able to do so, to have his parental rights terminated on the ground of permanent neglect.,
The majority did not read the language of the definition of permanent neglect as "encompassing [a] mental condition or status," nor did they treat mental incapacity as a physical disability.8 3 The majority stated:
Indeed, it may be contended that most natural mothers who fail
to plan for their own children are subject to some form of mental
disturbance; if mental inadequacy were to be considered an
acceptable excuse for failure to plan the scope of the statutory
provision would be narrowed to a point of near practical
uselessness."
Moreover, the majority reasoned that if the legislature had intended mental illness to serve as an excuse for the failure to
plan, the legislature could have so provided by including such a
statement in the definition of permanent neglect.8" Thus, the
79. Id.
80. Id. at 249-50, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 289. The appellate division
reasoned that mental illness would create a physical disability precluding the parent
from planning. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 9 for the statutory definition of permanent neglect.
82. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 250, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
Elaine's ability to maintain contact with Hime was not an issue, for Elaine had regularly

attended her monthly visits with Hime before any action was commenced. In re Suzanne
Y., 92 Misc.2d 652, 655, 401 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
83. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 250, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
84. Id. at 250-51, 418 N.E.2d at 1308-09, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
85. Id. at 251, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The majority noted that the
permanent neglect provision explicitly excluded alcoholism and drug abuse as possible
excuses for failing to plan, except where the parent was actually hospitalized or institutionalized for the sickness. Id. at 251 n.5, 418 N.E.2d at 1309 n.5, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290
n.5. The majority further acknowledged that the legislature had provided for mental illness in another subsection, reasoning that the omission of mental illness in the definition
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majority concluded that "mental illness does not, ipso facto, establish physical disability exonerating a parent from the obligation to plan for her child," and remanded the case to the appellate division to examine whether Elaine permanently neglected
Hime. 8"
2.

The Dissent

Judge Wachtler, joined by Judge Fuchsberg in the dissenting opinion, found the evidence sufficient to terminate Elaine's
parantal rights on the ground of her mental illness and inability
to care for Hime currently and in the near future.8 7 Judge Wachtler examined Elaine's history of mental illness and concluded
that the "record convincingly shows that this is a long-standing
and persistent mental disorder which has proven resistant to
successful treatment in the past, is presently uncorrected, and
will in all likelihood continue in the future at least during the
child's formative years." 8
The dissent objected to the majority's reading of the statute
as demanding clear and convincing evidence by "definitive" expert testimony of future mental illness and inability to care. 8 '
The statute, Judge Wachtler stated, does not attach such significance to the opinions of experts.90 He argued that requiring clear
and convincing evidence by "definitive" expert testimony of
such illness and inability imposes an "unrealistic requirement as
a prerequisite" considering the "traditional reluctance of candid
experts to offer opinions without some reservation.' 1
Judge Wachtler, in conclusion, remarked:
the statutory goal of providing permanent homes for children
whose parents' mental condition renders them unfit to raise...
[their children] now or in the foreseeable future .

should not

of permanent neglect was not an oversight by the legislature. Id. at 251, 418 N.E.2d at
1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
86. Id. at 251, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
87. Id. at 251-52, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).

88. Id.
89. Id. at 252, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. According to Judge Wachtler, the majority's test was not the proof of future
mental illness, but the absence of an expert's suggestion of a "vague possibility" of recovery from such illness. Id.
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be frustrated simply because an expert witness suggests a vague
possibility that the parent might at some date in the future, perhaps the distant future, recover from an illness that has resisted
treatment throughout the child's life, and long before the child
was born.9'
C.

Subsequent Decisions of In re Hime Y.

The appellate division, upon remand from the court of appeals, found Elaine to have permanently neglected Hime, by
failing, for a period of more than one year following the date
Hime came into the care of an authorized agency, to plan for
Hime's future, although physically and financially able to do
so.' The appellate division, following the guidance of the court
of appeals in reading the words "physically able" to plan, 9"
found Elaine to have "the power to perambulate, the strength to
handle the child, and the physical ability to execute a plan."' 5
Thus, the court deemed Elaine to be physically able to plan an
as required by statute, however the court noted "as a practical
matter, the mother could not 'physically' effectuate a plan that
she could not conceptualize or formulate."" The court also
deemed Elaine to be financially able to plan, based on her social
security benefits and the inference drawn from her refusal to
provide any details of her income or financial resources.' Termination of Elaine's parental rights was ordered, modifying the order of the family court on the grounds of Elaine's mental illness
and her permanent neglect of Hime."
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's decision, finding the weight of the evidence of Elaine's permanent

92. Id. at 252, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91 (Wachtler, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
93 In re Hime Y., 81 A.D.2d 313, 314, 440 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636 (1st Dep't 1981). The
court found Elaine to have failed to plan for Hime's future from her discharge from
Bellevue Hospital on June 26, 1975 to the commencement of this proceeding on August
18, 1976. Id.
94. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
95. In re Hime Y., 81 A.D.2d 313, 314, 440 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636 (1st Dep't 1981).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 316, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. The court noted that Elaine had disclosed at
a prior hearing that she was a professional singer, dancer, actress, and model. Id. at 316,
440 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
98. Id. at 317, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
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neglect to be sufficient to support termination of her parental
rights based on such neglect. 9"
IV.

Analysis

A. Expert Testimony and Mental Illness in the Foreseeable
Future
Section 384-b of the Social Services Law requires expert testimony of the parent's mental illness and inability to care "pres-

ently and for the foreseeable future" to terminate parental
rights. 10 0 Such testimony may be augmented by other relevant
evidence, but every proceeding to terminate parental rights on
the ground of mental illness must have a court-appointed expert

examine the parent's mental history and condition.101 Proof of
the parent's past and present mental illness can come from examinations and medical records, but proof of future mental illness must rest upon inferences drawn from the parent's past and
present condition.10 2 Inferences of future mental illness and in-

ability to care must meet the statutory requirement of clear and
99. In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282, 286, 429 N.E.2d 792, 793-94, 445 N.Y.S.2d 114,
115-116 (1981) (per curiam).
100. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Often the court-appointed psychiatrist examines the parent only "minutes before" he testifies. E.g., In re Sylvia M., 82
A.D.2d 217, 227, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214, 220 (1st Dep't 1981).
102. Prediction of future mental illness necessarily rests upon inferences drawn
from past behavior and speculation as to the person's reactions, in the future, to various

situations and stimuli. A.

WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS

301 (1968). The level of

accuracy of expert prediction of future mental illness, in Dr. Watson's view, does not
"remotely approach perfection." Id. Dr. Watson states:
[t]he well-trained dynamic psychiatrist, if he were to know specifically what future
events his patient would be subjected to, could predict with a high degree of accurancy what his patient's reactions would be. However, with the wide variety of
possible life situations, all of which impinge differently on the psyche and alter its
end product of action, it is very difficult to state specifically what the future behavior of an individual will be. The best possible prediction must be stated in
equivocal terms: If a certain type of event occur, and if the persons in his environment have been relating to him in a certain way, since the patient will follow his
typical patterns from the past, then his reaction will be such and such. This, of
course, is indefinite and leaves many ponderables. But, it limits possibilities in a
substantial way. While not so accurate as we might prefer, this is probably as good
a prediction as is possible at the present fime.
Id. at 301-02 (emphasis in original).
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convincing evidence to terminate parental rights.' To substantiate such inferences courts rely upon expert testimony to explain the possibility of the parent's recovery and to predict the
parent's future condition. Thus termination of parental rights
rests upon the expert's prediction of a slight chance of improvement in the parent's condition.
The majority in Hime Y., confronted with an expert's
favorable prediction of Elaine's mental condition, could not find
sufficient proof of her mental illness and inability to care for
Hime in the "foreseeable future."'" The expert's prediction of
Elaine's recovery sometime in the future prevented the termination of Elaine's parental rights based on her mental illness, despite her history of a long-standing mental illness with little or
no improvement. 0 5 As the dissent properly noted, few experts
are willing to give unequivocal opinions without some reservation l o° given the difficulty in assessing future mental condition
in light of advancements in treatment and medicine.107 The instances where an expert predicts little chance of recovery may
become rare. As a result of Hime Y., a mere possibility of recovery at some indeterminate date, or an inability to precisely determine the type or extent of the mental illness, 0 8 may serve as
justifications for refusing to terminate parental rights. Accord-

103. See supra notes 35, 78 and accompanying text.
104. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 249, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
105. Id. at 248, 418 N.E.2d at 1307, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
106. Id. at 252, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
107. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
108. Not every expert examining a parent will agree upon the parent's type of
mental illness. See, e.g., In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 241, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214, 228 (1st
Dep't 1981) (Fein, J., concurring). Judge Fein, concurring in the result of terminating the
parental rights of the mother on permanent neglect rather than mental illness, stated:
"[elven in this respect we cannot be unmindful of disputes among psychiatrists and in
the psychiatric literature concerning the appropriateness of diagnosing schizophrenia in
particular cases." Id.
Psychiatrists generally use widely accepted labels based on the presence of certain
signs and symptoms to define a person's mental condition. A. WATSON, supra note 102,
at 294. Dr. Watson states: [tihe judgment of which label to apply to a given patient is
indeed a difficult one. There very often will be considerable disagreement between psychiatrists in the choice of labels, even though all may tend to agree on the clinical findings they observe and which lead to the labeling. This is a factor of extreme importance
when evaluating the "battle of the experts."
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ingly, the applicability of the mental illness provision will be
limited to cases where the mental illness of the parent is so per-

vasive and debilitating that there can be little question of the
parent's inability to recover.
Section 384-b(4)(c), although requiring proof of inability in
the future, offers no specific guidance as to how far in the future

an expert's prediction must explore.109 The courts and the experts are left with the vague standard of the "foreseeable future" to assess the parent's mental condition and ability to care
for his child when determining whether parental rights should

be terminated.110 Although the vague standard has been looked

to as providing great leeway to the courts in protecting the parent's rights," such a standard permits great speculation which

can result in varied applications by the courts. This vague standard requires the courts to strain to find proof of mental illness
sufficient to terminate parental rights;11 2 if the parent has any
chance of recovery in the future, his child will be subjected to
temporary foster care placement with frequent disruptions of his
family setting with little hope of a stable family relationship by
either adoption or long-term placement. 8 To better protect the
child's interest in having a stable family relationship, a more
definite standard with realistic and measurable criteria needs to
be developed. Such a standard should adequately protect the
parent's rights, while permitting the courts and experts to assess

109. See supra note 74.
110. The time period covered by the term "the foreseeable future" is open to much
debate. The Elements of Style describes "the foreseeable future" as "[a] clich6, and a
fuzzy one. How much of the future is foreseeable? Ten minutes? Ten years? Any of it?
By whom is it foreseeable? Seers? Experts? Everybody? W. STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHrrE,
THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 59 (3d ed. 1979).
111. See, e.g., In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 236, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214, 225 (1st Dep't
1981).
112. See id. at 239, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 226-27. The court, deciding the second case
before it in a consolidated action, examined the record and noted that one expert
deemed the father to be a chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenic, but a psychiatrist
called by the father testified that the father was no longer a schizophrenic. Id. at 227,
443 N.Y.S.2d at 220. The expert for the father saw the father's recovery as very possible,
and "doubted that there could be 'a clear and convincing diagnosis' sufficient to make a
long term prediction." Id. at 228, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21. Despite this favorable testimony as to the father's possible recovery, the court found sufficient proof in the record
to terminate the father's parental rights on the ground of mental illness. Id. at 240, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 227.
113. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the parent's mental condition and ability to care."'
B. Mental Illness and the Ability to Plan
Unable to terminate Elaine's parental rights on the ground
of her mental illness and inability to care for Hime, the majority
advised that a parent's mental illness would not serve as an excuse from his planning for the child's future, thus permitting
termination of Elaine's parental rights on the ground of her permanent neglect of Hime." 0 The majority interpreted the permanent neglect provision as requiring the parent to be "physically
and financially able" to plan."' To be excused from planning a
parent must be institutionalized, incarcerated, physically disabled, or financially unable to plan; absent such situations a parent who fails for over one year to plan for his child's future,7 for
whatever reason, will have his parental rights terminated."
By failing to recognize the mentally ill parent's condition as
preventing such parent from being physically able to plan, the
majority relegates the status of being mentally ill to the same
level as being an alcoholic or a drug abuser. The majority, drawing support for not reading mental illness as an excuse from
planning, noted that alcoholism and drug abuse are not excuses
for failing to plan despite their possible adverse effects on the
parent's mental faculties, unless the parent is actually hospitalized for such illness." 8 By relying on the alcoholism and drug
114. Various standards to terminate parental rights in general have been offered by
many experts which may offer guidance in shaping better legislation. See, e.g., BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 24, at 53-64, (where the authors devised a "least detrimental alternative" approach, similar to a "best interests of the child" approach, focusing on the impact of the parental ability or unfitness as it affects the child); Wald, supra
note 28, at 688-700, (where the author uses age as a factor in determining the standard of
review, based on the adoptability of children and their best interests); NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, MODEL STATUTE FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIamrs,

supra note 57, at 201:0069.

115. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 251, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The
majority acknowledged, however, that one family court equated mental illness with a
physical disability, thus precluding the parent from being physically able to plan. Id. at
250, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing In re James S., 98 Misc.2d 650, 414
N.Y.S.2d 477 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 1979)).
116. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 250, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
117. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(4)(d), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra
note 9.
118. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 251 n.5, 418 N.E.2d at 1309 n.5, 437 N.Y.S.2d at
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abuse language as excluding mental capacity from the test of
permanent neglect, the majority effectively limits excuses from
failing to plan to the physical separation of the parent and child.
Future recovery from alcoholism or drug abuse is not a factor in
terminating parental rights based on permanent neglect; the test
only deals with past inability. 11 9 By treating mental illness similar to alcoholism or drug abuse, the majority avoids having to
find, by clear and convincing evidence, a parent's inability to
care in the "foreseeable future" due to his mental illness as required under the mental illness provision. 12 Consequently, a
parent who is not hospitalized for his mental illness is required
to plan for his child's future; if that parent fails to plan for over
one year, his parental rights will be terminated regardless of any
chance of his recovery in the near future.
The majority, by reasoning that mental incapacity is not a
physical disability, 2 1 establishes a planning requirement that ignores reality. Planning for the future of one's child is a process
demanding mental capacity. A parent must set developmental
aims for the child; at the same time, he must assess how much
money is needed, decide when to buy clothing, and make plans
for the child's schooling. Physical ability may be more important
in the day-to-day care of the child, but for the future of the
child the parent must be mentally able to formulate a plan. The
appellate division, on remand from the court of appeals, recognized this distinction stating, "as a practical matter, the mother
could not 'physically' effectuate a plan that she could not conceptualize or formulate." 22 Despite the appellate division's acknowledgment of this inconsistency in the majority's reading of
the permanent neglect provision, the court of appeals affirmed
the termination of Elaine's parental rights, never addressing this
issue.12 8 The result of the Hime Y decisions relegates planning
to mere physical and financial ability, with no consideration of

290 n.5. See supra note 85.
119. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(d), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See supra
note 9.
120. Id. § 384-b(4)(c). See supra note 4.
121. In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 250, 418 N.E.2d at 1308, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
122. In re Hime Y., 81 A.D.2d 313, 315, 440 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636 (1st Dep't 1981).
123. In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282, 286, 429 N.E.2d 792, 793, 445 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115
(1981) (per curiam).
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ability to conceptualize or formulate a plan.
In restricting the test for planning under the permanent
neglect provision to physical and financial ability, the majority
ignores the findings of the Temporary Commission of Child
Abuse and Neglect, the commission responsible for most of the
recent changes in the Social Services Law. 2 4 The commission,
interviewing people on the wording of the planning requirement
now contained in section 384-b(7)(a), found that "[t]he planning
requirement was viewed by many of those interviewed as an allusion to the most significant barometer of parental capacity.
They declare that parents are unable to think realistically about
the future, and that their plans are wistful fantasies. 1 25 A minority of persons interviewed proposed a substitute standard
modeled after the mental illness provision, where permanent
neglect would be "the inability of the parent to care properly for
the child in the foreseeable future." 2 6 Despite the commission's
findings that the general public viewed the planning requirement of the permanent neglect provision as more than physical
and financial ability, the majority refused to recognize any
mental element in the ability to plan for the purposes of the
permanent neglect provision.
Refusing to equate a mental illness with a physical disability, the majority in Hime Y. stated that to do so would effectively narrow the scope of the statute to "a point of near practical uselessness."'2 7 The majority's fear was that mental illness
would become a catchall excuse for the failure to plan for a child
when permanent neglect is alleged. 28 By eliminating mental illness as a possible excuse for failing to plan, the majority broadens the use of the permanent neglect provision, enabling termination of parental rights in instances where it was previously
impossible to do so. Rather than awaiting broad restriction or
expansion of the permanent neglect provision by judicial interpretation of the language and intent of the statute, the legisla-

124. See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD WELFARE, reprinted in, THE CHILDREN OF THE STATE: BARRIERS TO THE FREEING OF CHILDREN

(1976).
Id. at 26.
Id.
In re Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d at 251, 418 N.E.2d at 1309, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
See id. See supra text accompanying note 84.

FOR ADOPTION

125.
126.
127.
128.
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ture needs to redefine the provision and its excuses. The planning requirement should be redrawn to consider the parent's
mental, physical, and financial ability to care for his child's future. Further, there should be court-appointed psychiatrists to
augment the court's own fact-finding ability to help determine
whether certain excuses for the failure to plan by reason of
129
mental illness are bona fide.

The history of the termination of the parental rights statute
demonstrates the courts' difficulty in terminating parental rights
under the piecemeal guidance of the legislature.130 Termination
of parental rights based on the parent's mental illness has been
particularly difficult. Prior to the enactment of section 384b(4)(c) of the Social Services Law, such terminations were done
on the ground of abandonment of the child by the mentally ill
parent. "1 As a result of Hime Y., to terminate parental rights
under the mental illness provision there must be unequivocal,
uncontradicted expert opinion evidence of future mental illness
and inability to care for one's child.18 2 Only as a result of the
change by the legislature in 1973 of the permanent neglect provision's test of being able to maintain contact with and plan for
the child's future to being able to maintain contact with or plan
for the child's future is the majority in Hime Y able to extend
the permanent neglect provision to cover instances where a mentally ill parent fails to plan for his child's future despite the parent's frequent contacts with the child. 38 Rather than merely attempting to revive unworkable provisions by amending the
existing language or by adding new provisions, the legislature
needs to reevaluate the specific grounds of termination of parental rights and their interaction.
V. Conclusion
To terminate the parental rights of a parent on the statutory ground of mental illness, courts must find the parent unable
129. Cf. supra note 37 (court-appointed psychiatrists are required for termination
based on the mental illness provision).
130. See generally CHILDREN OF THE STATE I, supra note 4, at 44 (history of the
termination of parental rights statute).
131. Id. See supra note 4.
132. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 9.
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to care, by reason of his mental illness, for his child "presently
and for the foreseeable future." The court of appeals in Hime Y.
found the mother to be unable to care for her child currently,
but due to the court-appointed expert's favorable prediction of
the mother's recovery at some undetermined time in the "foreseeable future," the mother's parental rights could not be terminated based on her mental illness. If an expert, at trial, suggests
favorable recovery of the parent or refuses to rule out such possibility, the court may not use the mental illness provision to
terminate such parent's parental rights. The statutory test is
thus reduced to the absence of expert testimony of any future
recovery of the parent.
Unable to terminate the parent's parental rights under the
mental illness provision, the majority advised that such parent
could have her rights terminated on the ground of permanent
neglect by her failing to plan, although physically and financially
able to do so, for her child's future. A parent's mental illness will
not be an excuse from being physically able to plan, for the
court of appeals refused to equate a mental illness with a physical disability. By reading the words "physically able" to plan for
the child's future literally, the majority enforces a planning requirement that has no element of mental capacity. Such a requirement ignores reality and the legislative intent of the provision, and it reduces planning by a parent for his child's future to
a mere physical act.
William F. Bogle, Jr.
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